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The Treasury Guidelines Have Had Little Impact
Overall on U.S. International Philanthropy, But They
Have Had A Chilling Impact on US-Based Muslim
Charities
Barnett F. Baron'
My remarks this afternoon will comment on the Bjorklund-Reynoso
paper within the context of three broader questions:
1. What did the Treasury Guidelines say? What were we concerned
about?
2. Have the Guidelines had a measurable impact on international
grant-making?
3. What do we know about contributions by U.S.-based charities to
terrorist organizations?
I. What did the Treasury Guidelines say? What were we concerned
about?
The actual text of the Guidelines issued in November 2002 is
included in the background materials for this symposium, and we have
already heard a bit about them from Mr. Poncy and Mr. Mitchell. I will
therefore not review them in detail.
As you may know, the Treasury Guidelines provoked a great deal of
discussion and controversy within the philanthropic sector in this
country. The Council on Foundations, the Exempt Organizations
Committee of the Tax Section of the American Bar Association,
InterAction, Independent Sector, Grantmakers Without Borders, various
corporate grantmakers, and others responded to invitations by the
Treasury Department ("Treasury") and the Internal Revenue Service to
comment on the Guidelines and on other measures that IRS might
consider to strengthen due diligence and financial control requirements
for both domestic and international grant-making.
'Barnett F. Baron is the Executive Vice President of the Asia Foundation.
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While the comments differed in detail, their consistent central
message was that charitable organizations are already governed by a
comprehensive set of laws, regulations, and IRS rulings that effectively
prevent the diversion of charitable funds for any illegal purpose. The
Treasury Guidelines, in particular, were excessively burdensome and
impractical given the realities of international charitable work; unlikely
to achieve their goal of reducing the flow of funds to terrorist
organizations, but very likely to discourage international charitable
activities by U.S.-based organizations.
2
What are the issues? To be clear, no one in the foundation
community is in favor of providing funds to terrorists or terrorist
organizations. None of us disputes the legitimate right of the U.S.
government to take appropriate steps to ensure that funds intended for
charitable purposes are not diverted to terrorist purposes.
In an article published in the International Journal for Not-for-
Profit Law, which has been distributed as a background paper, I
suggested nine issues related to the Treasury Department's Anti-Terrorist
Financing Guidelines ("Guidelines").3 There isn't time to go over them
here, so I invite those of you interested in the details to read the paper. In
brief, the issues I raised are the following:
1. The voluntary versus mandatory nature of the Guidelines.
Although the Guidelines are described as voluntary, they actually
included both mandatory and suggested practices.4 Moreover, in the
context of the war on terror, the fact that the Guidelines were issued by
and reflected what a powerful agency of the U.S. government believed to
be appropriate practice carried the implication that they had to be given
more than mere voluntary deference. Many in the philanthropic
community feared that the Guidelines might become the framework for
congressional legislation.
2. There is a wide range of accepted "best practices" within the U.S.
grant-making community, because that community and the grantees it
serves are so diverse. Many intense hours of conference calls were spent
haggling over the range of current due diligence and grant-making
2. The responses are available online at http://www.usig.org (last visited Feb. 7,
2004).
3. Barnett F. Baron, Deterring Donors: Anti-Terrorist Financing Rules and
American Philanthropy, 6 INT'L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. (Jan. 2004), at
http://www.icnl.org/joumal/vol6iss2/ar_baron.htm.
4. See U.S. Department of the Treasury Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines:
Voluntary Best Practices for U.S.-Based Charities, available at http://www.ustreas.
gov/press/releases/docs/tocc.pdf (last modified Jan. 29, 2005).
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practices before we could produce agreed responses to Treasury.
3. The quality of the terrorist lists themselves, their dispersal among
many government agencies, the civil liberties issues that are sometimes
raised by non-transparent rules for inclusion on the lists, and the limited
ability of named individuals or organizations to learn why they were
included or what had to be done to be removed from the lists.
4. The vague and sweeping language of the Guidelines, with such
undefined terms as "deal with," "otherwise associated with," or being
"implicated in any questionable activity."
5
5. The Guidelines are silent on scalability, but one size cannot fit
all. The same due diligence is apparently required for a $150 employee
matching gift as for a $5 million grant. (More recently, public statements
by some Treasury officials have endorsed a more nuanced "risk-based"
approach to due diligence.)
6. Much of the required information is not readily or publicly
available to grant-makers in most developing countries. None of the
countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, or the Middle East has the same
public disclosure requirements for charitable organizations as the United
States.
7. The information required in the Guidelines may be available to
certain government agencies around the world, but foundations and other
grant-makers should not be required to act as surrogate police,
intelligence, or law enforcement agencies to obtain those data. In
addition, most grant-makers lack the expertise required to analyze, for
example, the banking relationships of prospective grantees in order to
prevent money laundering, as suggested by the Guidelines.6
8. Intrusive information gathering, much of it not related to the
project under consideration. The Guidelines suggest gathering a large
amount of information on prospective grantees and the organizations of
which they are part, including checking the bona fides of the potential
grantees' trustees and employees in every part of the host country or
every other jurisdiction in which it operates, whether or not those
individuals are directly involved in the project being funded.7 Grant-
makers feared that the process of collecting such "unrelated" information
is likely to raise questions about the grant-makers' non-charitable
intentions and may destroy the trust needed for effective grant-making.
5. See id.
6. Id. at § IV(C)(1).
7. Id. at § IV.
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9. In seeking to do legitimate charitable work in such politically
sensitive fields as poverty alleviation and the provision of economic
opportunity; promotion of civil society, gender equality, and human
rights; facilitating national, religious, or ethnic conflict management and
similar sensitive subjects, one wants to engage as many parties as
possible in dialogue, even those that may be considered "radical" or
"questionable" in local contexts. Since the terrorist lists are constantly
changing (and since the Guidelines refer not only to standard U.S.
government and United Nations lists, but also "any other official list
available" 8 to the grant-maker), the Guidelines make this sort of outreach
very risky.
Given all of these concerns, many in the philanthropic community
were concerned that the Guidelines would have a chilling effect on grant-
makers-not just the big foundations, but especially on less experienced
or smaller foundations and even on corporate employee matching gifts.
We feared that grant-makers would be so intimidated by the broad and
uncertain scope of the Guidelines that many would choose to forego all
international grant-making.
II. Have the Guidelines had a measurable impact on international grant-
making?
Despite these fears, the limited evidence currently available
suggests that aggregate levels of international philanthropic giving from
the United States have not-or not yet-been negatively impacted by the
anti-terrorist funding guidelines and associated rules. International grant-
makers have had to absorb significant additional costs associated with
list checking and higher levels of due diligence on potential grantees, but
this does not yet seem to have reduced their commitment to international
grant-making. It will take additional and more nuanced monitoring over
several years to begin to see whether the anti-terrorist financing rules are
having an impact at the aggregate level, and even then, it will be difficult
to single out their impact from that of other contextual factors, such as
general economic conditions, the stock market valuation of foundation
endowments, and the impact in any given year of unforeseen events,
such as major natural disasters. 9
8. Id. at § IV(B)(2).
9. Although detailed data are not available, it appears that the anti-terrorist
financing guidelines may have had a direct impact on the direction, if not yet the
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Available Data
Giving USA estimated that organizations that focus on international
affairs received $4.6 billion in contributions in 2002, an increase of 9.7
percent over 2001; and that those organizations received $5.3 billion in
2003, an increase of 12.1 percent over 2002.10
The most authoritative data on international grant-making by private
foundations are found in the series produced by the Foundation Center.
International Grantmaking III: An Update on U.S. Foundation Trends,
published in November 2004, is the most recent report in this series.1'
The report compares international giving in 1998 and 2002 based on an
analysis of all grants of $10,000 and over made by a sample of 1,009
foundations in 1998 and 1,005 foundations in 2002. These foundations
accounted for more than half of all foundation giving in 2002 and two-
thirds of estimated international giving. The report also estimates
international giving from all foundations in 2003 and, based on a May
2004 survey of 64 of the largest foundations, offers a qualitative
assessment of likely funding trends in 2004 and beyond.
According to the Foundation Center's analysis, international grant-
making by all U.S. private foundations peaked at an estimated $3.3
billion in 2001, slipped to $3.2 billion in 2002, and dipped further to
approximately $3 billion in 2002. The report attributes the downward
trend mainly to the protracted stock market decline after 1999 which
resulted in lower payouts, since most foundations base their payouts on a
lagging three year average of the market value of their endowments.
aggregate amounts, of corporate employee matching gift programs. After Executive
Order 13224 was published and at least two major corporations found that they had
inadvertently matched small employee gifts to listed organizations, several corporations
temporarily suspended their matching gift programs. American corporations have since
spent millions of dollars to develop list-checking and other compliance mechanisms.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that while employee matching gift programs have since
resumed, some are reported to be moving in the direction of matching employee
contributions only to a limited number of foreign charities approved in advance by the
corporation or to a limited number of U.S. charities with programs abroad, in contrast to
the earlier practice of matching contributions to organizations selected by employees
themselves.
10. AAFRC TRUST FOR PHILANTHROPY, Giving USA 2003 and Giving USA 2004,
reporting on the previous year's contributions from individuals, bequests, foundations,
and corporations. Giving USA 2003, at http://www.ahmp.com/giving%202002/
Giving%20USA%202002%2OFull%20version.ppt (last visited Jan. 31, 2005); Giving
USA 2004, at http://www.ahmp.com/resources.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2005).
11. THE FOUNDATION CENTER, New York, November 2004. Highlights of the
report are available at http://www.fdncenter.org/research/trends-analysis/pdf/intlhlts.pdf
(last visited Feb. 7, 2004).
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Despite the three year decline, the $3.0 billion in grants for international
purposes in 2002 represents a 47 percent increase over the $1.6 billion in
comparable grants made in 1998.
The 1,005 foundations included in the Foundation Center's survey
for 2002 contributed nearly $2.2 billion for international purposes, nearly
double the $1.07 billion they contributed in 1998. Even excluding the
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, which alone accounted for about
half the increase in the 1998 - 2002 period, international giving by the
major private foundations rose by 57 percent, exceeding the 53 percent
increase in foundation giving for all purposes. The survey also found that
more private donors were making international grants: 636 foundations
in the 2002 sample compared to 576 in 1998. Grants to U.S.-based
organizations that conducted international programs more than doubled
to $1.3 billion between 1998 and 2002, while cross-border giving (grants
made directly to recipients outside the U.S.) nearly doubled to $836
million. The share of direct giving to overseas recipients fell slightly
between 1998 and 2002, to 38.5 percent, "continuing a downward trend
that started in the mid-1990s.'
12
The Treasury Department's Voluntary Guidelines were issued in
November 2002, so the Foundation Center's analysis of international
grants made in 2002 cannot capture the possible impact of the
Guidelines. However, as noted above, the Center's estimate of
international giving by all foundations in 2003 shows only a modest
decline in funding, which the report attributes primarily to the impact of
previous declines in the market value of foundation endowments.
Moreover, the Center's May 2004 survey of 64 foundations, also
reported in International Grantmaking III, found that almost 90 percent
of the respondents expected their 2004 international giving to remain
unchanged (50 percent) or to increase (38 percent).
At the aggregate level, then, International Grantmaking III provides
no evidence that the Guidelines have had a chilling effect on
international grant-making by the nation's largest private foundations. To
the contrary, the Center found that international grant-making has
increased as a percentage of all grants made by those foundations, from
11 percent in 1998 to 14 percent in 2002. Paradoxically, however, the
survey also reported that about 80 percent of the 64 respondents agreed
with the statement that "it is now more difficult to fund internationally
due to a more demanding and uncertain regulatory environment," and
12. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
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almost 70 percent agreed that "the international 'war on terrorism' makes
funding overseas more difficult due to increased security risks abroad."
Thus it appears that the respondents are aware of the anti-terrorist
funding Guidelines and the additional costs imposed by them, but they
remain optimistic about maintaining or even increasing their own
international grant-making. The Foundation Center intends to examine
these issues in more depth in future surveys, including differentiating
between large and small foundations, since the latter have more limited
resources to cope with more demanding regulations, and monitoring
whether there is an acceleration of the long-term trend away from direct
grants to overseas recipients in favor of more grants to the international
programs of U.S.-based organizations.
13
Another relevant source of data is the Chronicle of Philanthropy's
annual Philanthropy 400 survey, based on the charities' Form 990
informational tax returns and a sample of follow-up interviews. Overall,
the survey found that private contributions to the country's 400 most
successful fundraising organizations increased 2.3 percent in 2003,
compared to a drop of 1.2 percent in 2002.14 The $6.3 billion in private
contributions for international programs represented a 38 percent
increase over 2002, by far the largest increase among the 15 program
categories covered in the survey and the third largest program category
in dollar terms after education ($15.2 billion) and youth and social
services ($7.7 billion). 15 In follow-up conversations with the authors of
the survey, I learned that while respondents cited several concerns that in
their view could affect their future fundraising, including stock market
fluctuations, the war in Iraq, the possibility of a terrorist attack, and
possible fallout from increased congressional scrutiny of the charitable
sector, not a single one of the 43 respondents with international programs
mentioned the anti-terrorist funding rules as a factor in fundraising. 16
In contrast to the substantial evidence that the anti-terrorist funding
guidelines have not-or not yet-had a chilling effect on charitable
donations and international grant-making at the aggregate level, there is
anecdotal evidence that particular segments of the international grant-
making community have been adversely affected, particularly U.S.-based
13. Interview at The Foundation Center, in New York, N.Y. (Nov. 10, 2004).
14. Holly Hall et al., Giving Slowly Rebounds, The Chron. of Philanthropy, Oct. 28,
2004, at 26, available at http://philanthropy.com/free/articles/vl 7/i02/02002601 .htm.
15. Id.




Muslim-American and Arab-American charities.
The Treasury Department's Anti-Terrorist Voluntary Guidelines
were issued in November 2002, in response to requests from Muslim-
American and Arab-American organizations seeking guidance on how to
avoid legal penalties while still being able to perform zakat and
contribute to Muslim charitable organizations in the United States and
abroad during the holy month of Ramadan. Prior to Ramadan 2004,
Treasury Secretary Snow issued another public statement "regarding the
sanctity of charitable giving," which included the following advice:
Through Zakat, Muslims have helped countless people around the globe
with their charity and kindness.
Sadly, some have preyed on the charitable spirit of Americans and our
friends worldwide by using charities as a conduit to finance terrorist
activity. Those who have corrupted the goodwill of donors do not represent
the mainstream values of people of good faith, including Muslims. As
President Bush has said, the face of terror is not the true faith of Islam;
which is a religion of peace.
The Treasury Department is working to stop the flow of terrorist funds that
infiltrate the charitable sector by identifying and designating charities that
finance al Qaida, Hamas and other terrorist organizations. In addition, we
continue to work closely with the Arab and Muslim communities, as well
as the charitable sector at large, to develop voluntary guidelines and
practices to help protect the integrity of the charitable sector and ensure
confidence in the donor community.
When you open your hearts to charity during Ramadan, we encourage you
to educate yourself on the activities of the charities to which you donate, to
help ensure that your generosity is not exploited for nefarious purposes.17
Many people viewed the November 2002 Guidelines and the
October 2004 statement as warnings directed primarily at the Muslim-
American and Arab-American communities. Consequently, charitable
contributions to the international activities of U.S.-based Muslim-
American and Arab-American charities are believed to have declined
substantially since 2001, although some of these donations appear to
have been redirected to other Muslim charities that provide domestic
social welfare services.18 Unfortunately, there has been no systematic
17. Press Release, Secretary Snow, United States Treasury Department, Charitable
Giving During Ramadan (Oct. 19, 2004), at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/
js2041.htm.
18. Among many press reports, see, e.g., Laurie Goodstein, Since 9/11, Muslims
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effort to collect data from those charities, so the evidence is limited to
occasional estimates offered by those charities and community leaders.
III. What do we know about contributions by U.S.-based charities to
terrorist organizations?
In remarks to the American Bar Association in May 2003, David
Aufhauser, then Treasury's General Counsel and chair of the U.S.
government's interagency Policy Coordinating Committee on Terrorist
Financing, expressed the view that charities were the "second largest"
source of funding for international terrorist activities. He was probably
referring to Islamic charities in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region. The
role of Islamic charities in financing al Qaeda was further elaborated in
the staff Monograph on Terrorist Financing prepared for the 9/11
Commission:
[A]l Qaeda was funded, to the tune of approximately $30 million per year,
by diversions of money from Islamic charities and the use of well-placed
financial facilitators who gathered money from both witting and unwitting
donors, primarily in the Gulf region ... . The United States is not, and has
not been, a substantial source of al Qaeda funding, although some funds
raised in the United States may have made their way to al Qaeda and its
affiliated groups (emphasis added).
... Al Qaeda's charities' strategy before 9/11 had two prongs. In some
instances, al Qaeda penetrated specific foreign branches of large,
internationally recognized charities. In many cases, lax oversight and the
charities' own ineffective financial controls, particularly over transactions
in remote regions of the world, made it easy for al Qaeda operatives to
divert money from charitable uses. These large international Gulf charities
donated money to end recipients, usually smaller in-country charities,
whose employees may have siphoned off money for al Qaeda. In the
second class of cases, entire charities from the top down may have known
of and even participated in the funneling of money to al Qaeda. 19
Look Closer to Home, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2004, at F; Radio Interview with Monique
Parsons, Muslims Turn to Local Charities, All Things Considered, National Public Radio
(Nov. 12, 2004), at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storild=4167703;
Teresa Watanabe, U.S. Muslims Temper Ramadan Giving With Caution, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 6, 2004, at B2.
19. JOHN ROTH ET AL., NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED




Executive Order 13224, issued on September 23, 2001, exercised
the statutory authority of the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act 20 ("IEEPA") to prohibit financial transactions with individuals and
organizations designated by the government to be associated with
terrorism and allows the government to freeze the assets controlled by
those organizations and those who support them. The IEEPA's provision
allowing the blocking of assets "during the pendency of an
investigation ''21 enabled the government to block the assets of designated
individuals and organizations even before criminal charges could be
brought against them.
As of September 30, 2004, the U.S. government had designated 387
individuals and organizations as terrorist entities or their supporters, and
"over $200 million of terrorist-related funds" had been frozen
worldwide, including more than $37 million in the U.S. 22 The amount of
funds frozen is quite small in relation to other potential sources of
terrorist funding, which include:
" Large-scale investments in many legitimate businesses
" Extensive stock market holdings
" Trafficking in drugs, cigarettes, and alcohol
" Trade in weapons
" Trade in diamonds, gold, other precious metals
" And kidnapping, extortion, and armed robbery.23
Documented evidence of charitable giving as a source of funding
for terrorist organizations is relatively rare, and is certainly dwarfed in
scale by the likely diversion of funds from other sources, including:
N Hawala, estimated at up to $200 billion a year24
20. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-07 (2004).
21. Id. at § 1702.
22. Combating International Terrorist Financing: Hearing on Terrorist Financing
and Financial Crimes Before the House Subcommittees on Domestic and International
Monetary Policy, Trade and Technology, House Committees on Financial Services,
108th Cong. 4 (2004) (statement of Juan Carlos Zarate, Assistant Secretary, Dep't of
Treasury) [hereinafter International Terrorist Financing], available at
http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/093004jz.pdf.
23. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-163, TERRORIST FINANCING: U.S.
AGENCIES SHOULD SYSTEMATICALLY ASSESS TERRORISTS' USE OF ALTERNATIVE
FINANCING MECHANISMS (Nov. 2003), at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04163.pdf;
LORETTA NAPOLEONI, MODERN JIHAD: TRACING THE DOLLARS BEHIND THE TERROR
NETWORKS (Pluto Press 2003); DOUGLAS FARAH, BLOOD FROM STONES (Broadway
2004).
24. NAPOLEONI, supra note 23; GAO, supra note 23; COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, TERRORIST FINANCING: REPORT OF AN INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE (2002), at
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" Remittances, estimated at a minimum of $150 million a year
by the World Bank
" Unregulated Islamic banking institutions throughout the
Middle East, which deal mostly in cash without systematic
reporting requirements.2 5
The staff Monograph on Terrorist Financing concludes that it has
proven impossible to completely close off funding to terrorist
organizations. Rather, "the current intelligence community approach
appropriately focuses on using financial information, in close
coordination with other types of intelligence, to identify and track
terrorist groups rather than to starve them of funding. 26 The Monograph
underlines the contrast between the relative ease of establishing "[links]
to terrorist [organizations] through common acquaintances, group
affiliations, historical relationships, phone communications ' ' 7 and the
extreme difficulty of being able to prove in a court of law that the
individual or organization so accused actually funded terrorist
organizations. Given those difficulties, being able to seize a suspected
organization's assets without having to "prove" wrong-doing is a
powerful administrative weapon in disrupting suspected terrorist
activities.
In recent testimony before Congress, Assistant Secretary Zarate
explained that being able to designate individuals and organizations as
terrorist entities under Executive Order 13224 has value far beyond the
limited amount of assets seized:
If used properly, designations can be valuable by: (1) shutting down the
pipeline through which designated parties raise and move money; (2)
informing third parties, who may be unwittingly financing terrorist activity,
of their association with supporters of terrorism; (3) deterring non-
designated parties, who might otherwise be willing to finance terrorist
activity; and (4) forcing terrorists to use potentially more costly, less
efficient and/or less reliable means of financing.
28
The staff Monograph noted that the government may have few
alternatives to using the authority of Executive Order 13224 and the
IEEPA, since it has proven so difficult to obtain evidence of terrorist
financing that would stand up to legal scrutiny, but that the designation
http://www.cfr.org/pdf/TerroristFinancingTF.pdf.
25. See, e.g., NAPOLEONI, supra note 23, chs. 9 - 10.
26. ROTH, supra note 19, at7.
27. Id. at 9.
28. See International Terrorist Financing, supra note 22.
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process itself raises substantial civil liberty concerns when applied to
U.S. citizens and organizations:
LEEPA's provision allowing blocking "during the pendency of an
investigation" is a powerful weapon with potentially dangerous
applications when applied to domestic institutions. This provision lets the
government shut down an organization without any formal determination
of wrongdoing. It requires a single piece of paper, signed by a midlevel
government official.... Using IEEPA at all against U.S. citizens and their
organizations raises potentially troubling civil liberties issues.... As the
Illinois charities cases demonstrate, IEEPA allows the freezing of an
organization's assets and its designation as a SDGT before any adjudication
of culpability by a court. The administrative record needed to justify a
designation can include newspaper articles and other hearsay normally
deemed too unreliable for a court of law. A designated entity can challenge
the designation in court, but its chances of success are limited. The legal
standard for overturning the designation is favorable to the government,
and the government can rely on classified evidence that it shows to thejudge but not defense counsel, depriving the designated entity of the usual
right to confront the evidence against it.
Against this background, the conclusions derived from the
Bjorklund-Reynoso analysis of the two Illinois charity cases are
particularly relevant. Those conclusions can be summarized as follows:
1. Although the anti-terrorist Guidelines and related rules are
intended to apply to all U.S.-based charities, no non-Muslim or non-
Arab-American charities have been indicted or are known to be under
investigation for diversion of funds for terrorist purposes.
2. While it is relatively easy to establish ideological and
communication links to terrorist organizations based on intelligence
investigations, that information is insufficient to serve as compelling
evidence that the indicted charities have actually funded terrorists, in part
because once funds leave the United States, they are "virtually
untraceable."
3. Despite intensive efforts in the BIF and GRF cases, the U.S.
government "has not been able to make any criminal charges against
GRF and resolved the case against BIF without a conviction for support
of terrorism."
4. In both the BIF and GRF cases, "high-ranking employees and
board members purposefully deceived donors and knowingly supplied
29. ROTH, supra note 19, at 122; see also David B. Ottaway, Groups, U.S. Battle
over "Global Terrorist " Label, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2004, at Al.
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funds for non-charitable activities."
5. The authors conclude that diversion occurs when actors are
criminally motivated, and that none of the cases reviewed in the paper
involved the inadvertent failure of due diligence procedures.
The authors ask why there have not been more charges and
allegations against U.S.-based charities, and conclude that several factors
are responsible, including:
1. a long history in the U.S. of carefully defining what is and is not
charitable activity;
2. federal, state, local press, donor and watchdog efforts to criticize
(and publicize) improper behavior by organizational managers;
3. increased transparency through wire transfers, internet research,
and information posting and reporting;
4. success of current best-practices and due diligence procedures
(written grant agreements; references for new grantees; reviewing
reports; questioning when reports are inadequate; and demanding
restoration of funds in appropriate cases); and
5. good use of common sense, in particular using a risk-based
approach under which the highest-risk grants or gifts receive a higher
level of pre- and post-grant scrutiny.
Conclusion
The information in this paper leads me to conclude that Executive
Order 13224 and the Treasury Department's Voluntary Guidelines have
succeeded in meeting their primary objectives. They have raised public
awareness of the potential abuse of U.S.-based charitable organizations
for terrorist purposes. They have provoked "mainstream" U.S. charities
to re-examine their current due diligence and grant-making procedures
and, in many cases, to tighten them. They have succeeded in "deterring
donors," albeit selectively. The available data suggest that grants to
"mainstream" international programs have not been greatly affected by
the anti-terrorist funding Guidelines, while there has been a chilling
impact on donations to Muslim organizations abroad and the
international programs of U.S.-based Muslim charities. And, through the
use of "naming and shaming" designations and asset freezing under the
authority of the IEEPA and Executive Order 13224, they have disrupted
the alleged terrorist-support activities of a small number of charities
against whom sufficient evidence could not be obtained for successful
prosecutions in a court of law.
13
